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In this electronic companion, we provide additional robustness checks and technical details com-
plementing the paper. In §§OA.1–OA.3, we provide the detailed analysis for §§8.1–8.3, respectively.
In §OA.4, we discuss the case in which a continuum of risk types exists. In §OA.5, we complement
§5.1 by examining a case in which TH = TL.
OA.1: Analysis for §8.1 (Candidate Autonomy)
Consistent with the rational queueing literature (see, e.g., Anand et al. 2011; Dai et al. 2017; Debo
et al. 2008; Paç and Veeraraghavan 2015), we consider a case in which each category-k candidate
adopts a mixed strategy such that the candidate accepts an organ offer from a type-i donor with
probability of ξki and declines it with the complementary probability. Endogenizing candidates’
decision to accept or decline offered organs in the presence of multiple queues with different priority
levels poses a significant analytical challenge. For tractability and ease of exposition, we make
several simplifying assumptions. First, to reflect the priority of candidates with a higher level
of medical urgency to decide whether to accept or decline offered organs, we assume category-1
candidates are prioritized to received organs from low-risk donors. Second, we focus on the case in
which organs from low-risk donors are not enough for all category-1 candidates, which is consistent
with the observation that high-quality organs are rarely offered to patients of a lower-ranking
category. Clearly, a category-1 candidate, when offered an organ from a low-risk donor, should
always accept the offered organ; that is, ξ1L = 1. When offered an organ from a high-risk donor,
however, the candidate may opt to decline the offer; that is, ξ1H ∈ (0,1); we define ξ , ξ1H for
simplicity of notation. On the other hand, it is rational for category-2 candidates to accept all the
organ offers because they are offered organs only from high-risk donors; that is, ξ2H = ξ2L = 1.
Before the introduction of the donor-priority rule, the threshold cost of donating in equilibrium
is Ci = 0, i=H,L. We obtain the following equations:
λ2 =
∑
i∈{L,H}
Θip2, λ1 = (λ2−µ2)
τ2
τ2 + δ2
+
∑
i∈{L,H}
Θip1 + [λ1−ΦLF (CL)] (1− ξ) ; (OA1)
µ2 = µ1−λ1, µ1 = [λ1−ΦLF (CL)] (1− ξ) +
∑
i∈{L,H}
ΦiF (Ci), (OA2)
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where the term [λ1−ΦLF (CL)] (1− ξ) in (OA1) represents the arrival rate of the category-1 can-
didates who opt to decline organ offers from high-risk donors and stay on the wait list. The same
term, in (OA2), can be interpreted as the arrival rate of organ offers those category-1 candidates
decline.
An equilibrium requires that, when receiving an organ offer from a high-risk donor, each category-
1 candidate must be indifferent between accepting the offer and declining it. The candidate’s
post-transplantation QALE is βTH if accepting an organ from a high-risk donor. Otherwise, if the
candidate declines the offer, following the asymptotic results (Zenios 1999), the probability that
the candidate receives an organ from a low-risk donor is approximately ΦLF (CL)
λ1
; the probability
that the candidate receives an organ offer from a high-risk donor and accepts the offer is, approxi-
mately, [1− ΦLF (CL)
λ1
]ξ; the candidate’s pre-transplantation life expectancy while on the wait list is
approximately (1− ξ)[1− ΦLF (CL)
λ1
] · α
δ1
. Hence, the equilibrium condition can be stated as follows:
βTH =
[
1− ΦLF (CL)
λ1
]
ξβTH +
ΦLF (CL)
λ1
βTL +
[
1− ΦLF (CL)
λ1
]
(1− ξ) α
δ1
. (OA3)
The above condition implies that in equilibrium, each category-1 candidate has an ex-ante expected
utility equal to βTH . In other words, all category-1 candidates become worse off in the presence
of candidate autonomy, which allows them to choose whether to accept an organ offer or not to
maximize their own expected utility. This consequence is attributed to the negative externality
of category-1 candidates’ declining of organ offers. While candidates decline organ offers from
high-risk donors and wait for organ offers from low-risk donors, the category-1 wait list expands,
reducing others’ chances of receiving organ transplants. We characterize the equilibrium outcome
in the following lemma:
Lemma OA1. In the case with candidate autonomy, before the introduction of the donor-priority
rule, in equilibrium, Ci = 0, i=H,L, and
(i) each category-1 candidate chooses a probability ξ ∈ (0,1) with which the candidate accepts an
organ offer from a high-risk donor, which is determined by
ξ = 1− ΦLF (CL)β (TL−TH)
[λ1−ΦLF (CL)]
(
βTH − αδ1
) ;
(ii) the arrival rates of candidates and organs are
λ1 =
∑
i∈{L,H}
Θip1 +
τ2
δ2
∑
i∈{L,H}
[Θi−ΦiF (Ci)] +
ΦLF (CL)β (TL−TH)
βTH − αδ1
, and
µ2 =
∑
i∈{L,H}
Θip2−
τ2 + δ2
δ2
∑
i∈{L,H}
[Θi−ΦiF (Ci)] .
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Proof of Lemma OA1. From (OA3), we can obtain
[
1 − ΦLF (CL)
λ1
]
(1− ξ)βTH =
ΦLF (CL)
λ1
β (TL−TH) +
[
1 − ΦLF (CL)
λ1
]
(1− ξ)α 1
δ1
, which gives ξ = 1 − ΦLF (CL)β(TL−TH )
[λ1−ΦLF (CL)]
(
βTH− αδ1
) . Using
the above equation as well as λ2 =
∑
i∈{L,H}Θip2, µ2 = µ1 − λ1, and (OA2) into (OA1), we can
obtain
λ1 =
∑
i∈{L,H}
Θip1 +
τ2
δ2
∑
i∈{L,H}
[Θi−ΦiF (Ci)] +
ΦLF (CL)β (TL−TH)
βTH − αδ1
.
Plugging the above formula of λ1 into (OA2), we can derive µ1 as well as µ2 = µ1−λ1. Q.E.D.
Under the donor-priority rule, within the same category, those individuals who have registered
to become organ donors have priority to receive an organ transplant. We denote by CAi type-i
individual’s threshold cost of donating in equilibrium.
Proposition OA1. In the case with candidate autonomy, in equilibrium, the threshold costs of
donating, CAH and C
A
L , satisfy
CAi =
θi
θi +σi
· (βTH −α/δ2) ·
∑
i∈{L,H}[Θi−ΦiF (CAi )]∑
i∈{L,H}Θi[1−F (CAi )]
for i=H,L.
Proof of Proposition OA1. Consider a type-i individual with the threshold cost CAi , i=H,L. Similar
to § 5, we can obtain the formulas of λ1 and µ2 as in Lemma OA1. Compared with § 5, the only
difference is that each category-1 candidate has an ex-ante expected utility of βTH , and all organs
for category-2 candidates are from high-risk donors. Hence, the net utility of a type-i individual with
a cost c by registering and not registering to become an organ donor is U id(c) =
1
θi+σi
+ θi
θi+σi
βTH−c,
and U in =
1
θi+σi
+ θi
θi+σi
{
βTH−
∑
j∈{L,H}[Θj−ΦjF (C
A
j )]∑
j∈{L,H}Θj [1−F (CAj )]
(βTH −α/δ2)
}
, respectively. In equilibrium, the
individual is indifferent between joining the donor registry or not; that is, U id(c) =U
i
n for i=H,L,
which can be rewritten as CAi =
θi
θi+σi
∑
j∈{L,H}[Θj−ΦjF(C∗j )]∑
j∈{L,H}Θj [1−F (C∗j )]
(βTH −α/δ2) for i=H,L. Q.E.D.
The following corollary is immediate from Proposition OA1:
Corollary OA1.
CAH
CA
L
= θH/(θH+σH )
θL/(θL+σL)
> 1.
Using the expressions of λ1 and µ2 and the threshold cost of donating Ci, i=H,L, we can now
represent the social welfare as
Ws (CL,CH) =
∑
i∈{L,H}
[ 1
θi +σi
·Λi + Θiα/δ2 + ΦiF (Ci) (βTH −α/δ2)−Λi
∫ Ci
−∞
cf (c)dc
]
,
where Ci = 0 before the introduction of the donor-priority rule, and Ci =C
A
i after the introduction
of the donor-priority rule. In the above social-welfare characterization, for each risk-type i∈ {L,H},
the second term Θiα/δ2 represents the aggregate pre-transplantation utility of individuals who
become transplant candidates, the third term ΦiF (Ci) (βTH −α/δ2) represents the marginal utility
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increase to those individuals due to organ transplants, and the last term Λi
∫ Ci
−∞ cf (c)dc represents
the total cost of donating from type-i individuals. Compared to the case without candidate auton-
omy, the sole difference is that the social-welfare improvement due to organs donated by type L
individuals is reduced to ΦLF (CL) (βTH −α/δ2) instead of ΦLF (CL) (βTL−α/δ2). The benefits
of low-risk organs are systematically canceled out in equilibrium due to the equilibrium condition
(OA3).
As suggested in Corollary OA1, the donor-priority rule still results in asymmetric incentives, so
introducing the donor-priority rule can still reduce the social welfare.
OA.2: Analysis for §8.2 (Moral Hazard)
The value from undertaking this risky action v ∈ (−∞,∞) is randomly distributed and has a prob-
ability density function of g (·). We assume this value v and the cost of donating c are independent.
Before the introduction of the donor-priority rule, the decision to take risk and the decision to
register to become donors are independent. In equilibrium, a unique cutoff value v∗np exists such
that only individuals with value higher than v∗np choose to undertake the risky action and become
type H.
Lemma OA2. Before the introduction of the donor-priority rule, the equilibrium threshold cost
of donating is C∗np = 0, and the equilibrium cutoff value v
∗
np is uniquely determined by
v∗np =
1
θL +σL
− 1
θH +σH
+
(
θL
θL +σL
− θH
θH +σH
)(
α/δ2 +
∑
i=H,L
σiφn
θi+σi
ΛiF (0)∑
i=H,L
θi
θi+σi
Λi
(βTa−α/δ2)
)
,
in which ΛL =G
(
v∗np
)
Λ, ΛH = Λ−ΛL, and Ta =
∑
i=L,H
σiφn
θi+σi
ΛiTi∑
i=L,H
σiφn
θi+σi
Λi
.
Proof of Lemma OA2. Before the introduction of the donor-priority rule, donating produces
no direct benefits, so the equilibrium threshold cost of donating is C∗np = 0. Denote by v
∗
np
the equilibrium cutoff value. We have ΛL = G
(
v∗np
)
Λ, ΛH = Λ − ΛL, and Ta =
∑
i=L,H
σiφn
θi+σi
ΛiTi∑
i=L,H
σiφn
θi+σi
Λi
.
An individual with a cutoff value is indifferent between taking risk and not taking risk;
that is, v∗np +
1
θH+σH
+ θH
θH+σH
[
α/δ2 +
∑
i=H,L
σiφn
θi+σi
ΛiF (0)∑
i=H,L
θi
θi+σi
Λi
(βTa−α/δ2)
]
= 1
θL+σL
+ θL
θL+σL
[
α/δ2 +∑
i=H,L
σiφn
θi+σi
ΛiF (0)∑
i=H,L
θi
θi+σi
Λi
(βTa−α/δ2)
]
, which gives the representation of v∗np. Q.E.D.
An individual chooses to become of high risk type if and only if the value from the risky action
is high enough. We illustrate in Figure OA.1(a) the equilibrium before the introduction of the
donor-priority rule.
After the introduction of the donor-priority rule, the risk-taking decision and the donating deci-
sion can be interdependent, because the benefits from the donor-priority rule depend on whether an
individual undertakes the risk and becomes of high risk type or not. For ease of exposition, we define
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ΛL = Λ
∫∞
−∞G
(
v∗p (C)
)
f (C)dC, ΛH = Λ − ΛL, ΛL,d = ΛG (CML + ∆)F (CML ) ,ΛL,nd = ΛL − ΛL,d,
ΛH,nd = Λ(1−F (CMH )) (1−G (CMH + ∆)) ,ΛH,d = ΛH −ΛH,nd, and TMp =
∑
i=L,H
σiφn
θi+σi
Λi,dTi∑
i=L,H
σiφn
θi+σi
Λi,d
.
Proposition OA2. After the introduction of the donor-priority rule, the equilibrium threshold
cost of donating is still C∗p (v), and the equilibrium cutoff value v
∗
p (C) is
C∗p (v) =

CMH if v≥CMH + ∆
v−∆ if CL + ∆≤ v≤CMH + ∆
CML if v≤CML + ∆
and v∗p (C) =

CMH + ∆ if C ≥CMH
C + ∆ if CML ≤C ≤CMH
CML + ∆ if C ≤CML
,
where CMH ,C
M
L ,∆ are jointly determined by
CMi =
θi
θi +σi
· (βTMp −α/δ2) ·
∑
i=L,H
(
θi
θi+σi
Λi− σiφnθi+σiΛi,d
)
∑
i=L,H
θi
θi+σi
Λi,nd
, for i=H,L, (OA4)
∆ =
1
θL +σL
− 1
θH +σH
+
(
θL
θL +σL
− θH
θH +σH
)
βTMp −CML . (OA5)
Proof of Proposition OA2. Denote by Λi,Λi,d, and Λi,nd the equilibrium arrival rate of all type-i
individuals, type-i donors, and type-i non-donors, respectively. After the introduction of the donor-
priority rule, similar to the case in which the risk type is exogenous, given the risk-taking decision
and thus the risk type i, the equilibrium threshold cost of donating is determined by
CMi =
θi
θi +σi
· (βTMp −α/δ2) ·
∑
i=L,H
(
θi
θi+σi
Λi− σiφnθi+σiΛi,d
)
∑
i=L,H
θi
θi+σi
Λi,nd
,
for i = H,L. Similar to the result in Lemma OA2, given the donating decision, the equilibrium
cutoff value is determined by v∗p,d =
1
θL+σL
− 1
θH+σH
+
(
θL
θL+σL
− θH
θH+σH
)
βTMp . Hence, individuals
with v≤ v∗p,d and C ≤CML choose to sign up as donors and not to take risk. Denote by ∆ = v∗p,d−CML
the net cost from QALE by choosing to both take risk and sign up as donors (instead of neither
of them). The expression suggests individuals with v − C ≥ ∆ prefer the combination of taking
risk and signing up as donors to the combination of neither taking risk nor signing up as donors.
Therefore, the equilibrium threshold cost of donating C∗p (v) and the equilibrium cutoff value v
∗
p (C)
are determined accordingly as expressed in the proposition. Q.E.D.
In Proposition OA2, (OA4) reflects that those individuals who have become risk type i and
have cost of donating CMi are indifferent between donating and not donating, and (OA5) reflects
that those individuals with v−C = ∆ and C ∈ (CML ,CMH ) are indifferent between both taking risk
and registering to become a donor and choosing neither. The equilibrium population with donor
priority is illustrated in Figure OA.1(b).
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Figure OA.1 Equilibrium with moral hazard
OA.3: Analysis for §8.3 (Dynamics in Decision to Register)
We now consider an extension in which an individual of type L can turn into type H over time. The
transition time is exponentially distributed with a mean duration of 1/τ . Denote the probability of
type-L and -H individuals becoming sick and in need of organ transplantation by θ̂L =
θL
θL+σL+τ
and
θ̂H =
θH
θH+σH
, respectively. Intuitively, we assume θ̂L < θ̂H . Hence, the arrival rates of candidates and
organs from different risk types are ΘL = θ̂LΛL, ΘH = θ̂H
(
ΛH +
τ
θL+σL+τ
ΛL
)
, ΦL =
σLφn
θL+σL+τ
ΛL, and
ΦH =
σHφn
θH+σH
(
ΛH +
τ
θL+σL+τ
ΛL
)
. Similarly, we can characterize the equilibrium in the following
proposition.
Proposition OA3. In equilibrium, the threshold costs of donating, C∗H and C
∗
L, satisfy
C∗i = θ̂i · (βTp(C∗H ,C∗L)−α/δ2) ·
∑
j∈{L,H}
[
Θj −ΦjF
(
C∗j
)]∑
j∈{L,H}Θj[1−F (C∗j )]
for i=H,L,
and the above equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof of Proposition OA3. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3, except the probability of
type-i individuals becoming sick and needing organ transplantation is now θ̂i. Q.E.D.
OA.4: Continuous Risk Types
In the paper, for simplicity of analysis, we assume a discrete number of risk types. In this extension,
we generalize our analysis to the case with a continuum of risk types, and show our key insights
carry over. Each individual is characterized by a cost of donating, denoted by c, and a risk type
i∈ I, with a larger i corresponding to a riskier type. In other words, in line with the discrete-type
setting, we assume both θi and
θi
θi+σi
are increasing in i, whereas Ti is decreasing in i. Similarly, we
denote by Λi the measure of arrival rate of an individual being type i, and thus, the total arrival
rate of healthy individuals is
∫
i∈I Λidi= Λ. We also use Θi and Φi to represent the measure of the
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arrival rate of transplant candidates who were type-i individuals and the measure of the arrival
rate of organ supply from type-i individuals.
It is rather straightforward to confirm that after introducing the donor-priority rule, the threshold
costs of donating are determined by
C∗i =
θi
θi +σi
· [βT ∗p −α/δ2] ·
∫
j∈I[Θj −ΦjF (C
∗
j )]∫
j∈I Θj[1−F (C
∗
j )]
,∀i∈ I,
where T ∗p =
∫
j∈I ΦjF (C
∗
j )Tj∫
j∈I ΦjF (C
∗
j )
represents the average post-transplant life expectancy in equilibrium. It
immediately follows with the following property:
∀i, j ∈ I,C∗i /C∗j =
θi/(θi +σi)
θj/(θj +σj)
.
This result implies the threshold cost of donating for individuals of the riskier type is higher, sug-
gesting the donor-priority rule still provides stronger incentives for riskier types. As the asymmetric
incentives still present, introducing the donor-priority rule can decrease social welfare in such a
continuous modeling framework. The condition will be more complicated because it depends on
the distribution of the types as well as how θi, σi, and Ti evolve with type i∈ I. When introducing
the donor-priority rule decreases social welfare, enforcing a similar freezing-period remedy can help
mitigate the asymmetric incentives and ensure social-welfare improvement.
OA.5: The Scenario of TH = TL.
Throughout the paper, we assume organ quality differs across risk types; that is, TH < TL. We
now depart from this assumption, which allows us to isolate the effect of the heterogeneity of the
probability of requiring organ transplants.
Remark OA1. Even when TH = TL, social welfare may still decrease after introducing the
donor-priority rule. For example, when Λ = 4 million/year ΛH = 0.2Λ = 0.8 million/year, ΛL =
0.8Λ = 3.2 million/year, σL = 0.01, σH = 0.1, θL = 0.000014, θH = 0.001046, TH = TL = 16.4, φ =
0.05, n = 0.35, β = 0.75, α = 0.5, 1/δ2 = 5.83, c ∼ N(0,0.16), we have CH = 0.1104,CL = 0.0149,
and the resultant social-welfare difference becomes W hp −W hnp =−$25.33 million/year after scaled
by the economic value per quality-adjusted life-year to be $50,000.
The numerical example in the above remark is rather surprising; it shows social welfare can
decrease even if the asymmetric incentives do not reduce the average quality of the organ supply.
To understand this result, note that when high-risk individuals are much more likely to need organ
transplants, they respond to the donor-priority rule by registering even when their costs of donat-
ing are excessively high. Indeed, those high-risk individuals perceive the benefit of registering to
become organ donors under the donor-priority rule without incorporating the negative externality
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on non-donors. Hence, their high costs of donating can outweigh the social welfare from additional
registered organ donors. The decisions to donate by high-risk individuals with excessively high
costs of donating are privately but not socially optimal under the donor-priority rule.
Remark OA1 highlights a commonly overlooked aspect in analyzing the social-welfare conse-
quences of organ-donation policies: Certain individuals may be “pressured” into registering to
become organ donors despite their excessively high costs of donating; as a result, more organ
donation—even under the same organ quality—may not necessarily translate into higher social
welfare.
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